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Bruce Ziff*

Death to Semelhago!

In the 1996 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Semelhago v.
Paramadevan, Justice John Sopinka stated that it is no longer appropriate to
assume that specific performance will issue as a matter of course to enforce
a contract for the sale of land. Before performance will be ordered, it must be
proven (and not assumed) that common law damages for breach of contract will
not suffice to do justice. In this article, Semel hago and the case law generated in
its aftermath will be reviewed, and the policy arguments pertaining to the current
law addressed. In short, it will be argued that the Semelhago dictum should be
rejected.

Dans I'arrdt Semelhago c. Paramadevan de 1996 de la Cour suprdme du
Canada, le juge John Sopinka affirmait qu'il ne convient plus de prdsumer que
I'exdcution intdgrale d'un contrat pour la vente d'un bien immeuble sera accordde
automatiquement. Avant que Iexdcution soit ordonnde, il doit 6tre ddmontr6 (et
non presume) que des dommages-intbr~ts accordds en vertu de la common law
pour la rupture du contrat constitueront une reparation inadequate. Dans cet
article, Iarrdt Semelhago et la jurisprudence qui I'a suivi sont passes en revue,
et les considerations de principe relatives a la loi actuelle sont examinees. Tout
compte fait, Iauteur allegue que Iobiter de Semelhago doit 6tre rejetd.

* Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. I am grateful to Gail Henderson and David Percy for their
helpful comments.
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Introduction
In 2014, over 480,000 residential properties changed hands in Canada.'
Most deals are completed as agreed. Yet, occasionally things go awry.
At or near the closing, the vendor may indicate that the land will not be
transferred. Where there is no valid reason for so doing, the reneging
vendor is in breach of contract.
In response, the purchaser may accept the breach, treat the contract
as having ended, and seek damages. Alternatively, that party may refuse
to accept the breach and sue for specific performance. If so, the contract
remains alive and is enforceable by and against either party. In effect,
the contract is revived, and the vendor may avoid a finding of breach
1.
Canadian Real Estate Association, National Statistics, online: <creastats.crea.ca/natl/index.
htm>. In 2013, the figure was 457,761 according to CMC, Canadian Housing Observer (Ottawa:
CMHC, 2014) at E-6.
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by tendering.2 A party otherwise entitled to specific performance may
abandon that claim and seek equitable damages instead.
When the purchaser prefers to obtain the land, an intuitively fair
response to this scenario is easy to imagine. A lay observer might conclude
that people should keep their promises. When the purchaser tenders
payment, one would expect the vendor to live up to the bargain. If called
upon to adjudicate, a court should then require the vendor to perform the
contract to the letter or risk a finding of contempt. An award of damages
would likely be seen as a consolation prize. 3
On many occasions, that is precisely the way the matter is resolved.
However, in Canada, an order for specific performance is only the back-up
remedy in such cases. An award of damages to compensate the innocent
purchaser is the presumptive response. All else being equal, the vendor
will be allowed to keep the property by paying damages for the breach.
In the 1996 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Semelhago v.
Paramadevan, Justice John Sopinka stated that it is no longer appropriate
to assume that specific performance will issue as a matter of course to
enforce a contract for the sale of land. Before performance will be ordered,
it must be proven (and not assumed) that common law damages for breach
of contract will not suffice to do justice.
The sole point of this article is to advance the argument that the
Semelhago dictum is bad law and should be rejected.
This is not the first time that it has been offered that the Semelhago
principle should be abandoned. Two Canadian law reform agencies
have come to the same conclusion.' Commentators have cast doubt on
its appropriateness from time to time.6 However, action has not yet been
taken anywhere in Canada to go a different route. Moreover, Semelhago

2.

Semelhago v Paramadevan,[1996] 2 SCR 415 at para 15 [Semelhago].

3.
Compare the oft-cited non-lay position of Oliver Wendell Holmes in "The Path of the Law"
(1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457 at 462: "The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else."
4.

Semelhago, supra note 2.

5.
Alberta Law Reform Institute, "Contracts for the Sale and Purchase of Land: Purchasers'
Remedies" (2009) ALRI Final Report No 97, online: <www.alri.ualberta.ca>. Manitoba Law Reform
Commission, "The Remedy of Specific Performance and the Uniqueness of Land in Manitoba" (2010)
MLRC Informal Report 26, online: <www.manitobalawreform.ca>. See also Manitoba Law Reform
Commission, "Revised Recommendation to Informal Report 26" (2011) MLFR, online: <www.
manitobalawreform.ca>.
6.
OV Da Silva, "The Supreme Court of Canada's Lost Opportunity: Semelhago v Paramadevan"
(1998) 23 Queen's LJ 475; DH Clark, "'Will that Be Performance.. Or Cash?': Semelhago v
Paramadevan and the Notion of Equivalence" (1999) 37 Alta L Rev 589; M Lavoie, "Canada's
'Unique' Approach to Specific Performance in Contracts for the Sale of Land: Some Theoretical and
Practical Insights" (2013) 12 OUCLJ 207.
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has its supporters,' and the Supreme Court of Canada implicitly reaffirmed
the ruling in 2012.8 As a result, I offer this critique.
The discussion is organized as follows. In Part I, the doctrinal platform
on which the law of remedies in land sales is based is outlined. At its core
is the idea that a contract for the purchase and sale of land can be seen
as creating an equitable interest in the land in any case in which equity
would order performance of the agreement. In Part II, the key elements
of the ruling in Semelhago are presented. In the nearly two decades since
that decision, there have been dozens of reported decisions that have
applied, distinguished, explained, and refined the law. This part contains a
description of the current law by taking account of those developments. In
Part III the principal policy considerations are canvassed.
I.

Some fundamentals

1. Specific performance and equitable interests in land
An agreement for purchase and sale typically calls for the land in question
to be conveyed on a designated date. The period between the time at which
the agreement is signed and the closing date is used for various purposes,
such as determining the validity of the vendor's title, securing financing,
and arranging for relocation. During this pre-closing period, the purchaser
may choose to lodge a notice on the title to ensure that no subsequent
dealings with the land will adversely affect that party's interest.
It has long been understood that once the agreement has been executed,
that is, even before legal title passes on the closing date, the purchaser has
more than just a contractual right against the vendor. The purchaser is said
to hold an equitable interest in the property.9 As a corollary, the vendor
is treated as a constructive trustee; the purchaser is the cestui que trust.
The trust is an unorthodox one, for during its operation the vendor is not
stripped of all beneficial entitlements to the land. Absent a contractual term
to the contrary, the vendor continues to have a right of possession, and is
entitled to any rents and profits generated prior to closing. The principal
7.
See e.g. J Berryman, "Recent Developments in the Law of Equitable Remedies: What Canada
CanDo forYou" (2002) 33 VUWLR 51, at Part IV, passim. See also TD Marsh, "Sometimes Blackacre
is a Widget: Rethinking Commercial Real Estate Contract Remedies" (2010) 88 Neb L Rev 635.
8.

Southcott Estates Inc v Toronto Catholic DistrictSchool Bd, 2012 SCC 51, 2012 CarswellOnt

12505, critiqued in A Swan & J Adamski "Specific Performance, Mitigation and Corporate Groups: A
Comment on Southcott Estates Inc v Toronto Catholic DistrictSchool Board" (2014) 56 Can Bus LJ

104. See also J O'Sullivan, "Mitigation and Specific Performance in the Canadian Supreme Court"
(2013) 72 Camb LJ 253; M McInnes, "Specific Performance and Mitigation in the Supreme Court of
Canada" (2013) 129 Law Q Rev 165.
9.
See further PG Turner, "Understanding the Constructive Trust between Vendor and Purchaser"
(2012) 128 Law Q Rev 582. See also Midas Realty Corp v Galvic Investments Ltd, 2008 CarswellOnt
3087, 70 RPR (4th) 261 (SCJ).
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duties of the vendor as trustee are to preserve the property and to convey
it as required.
The basis for this trust flows from the maxim that equity treats as
done that which ought to be done. As there is a promise to convey the
land, equity treats the purchaser as already enjoying the status of owner.
However, that treatment is contingent on whether equity will order specific
performance of the contract. In other words, if and only if equity would
compel the transfer of title, will it conceive of the purchaser as being an
owner in the interim.10
Treating the availability of specific performance as the sine qua non
of an equitable interest creates a paradox. The purchaser's equity (and the
creation of this special constructive trust) is treated as arising the moment
the contract is made. However, whether equity will compel this transfer
to be completed is never certain at that point. Before equity will order
performance it must be shown that damages provide an inadequate remedy.
The position for a very long time was that land was regarded as unique so
that an order for damages was not normally an acceptable response to
a breach." Even so, an order for performance was not inevitable. There
may be conditions and undertakings contained in the agreement that first
must be satisfied. Moreover, all equitable remedies are discretionary;
they cannot be demanded as of right. A purchaser guilty of delay, or who
otherwise engages in inappropriate action prior to closing, may be denied
specific performance.12
Some account for this paradox has been required. For example, under
the Alberta Land Titles Act, a caveat can be filed only for an interest in
land.13 An equitable interest arising from a contract of purchase qualifies.
The interest in the land is premised on the willingness of equity to order
specific performance, and again, at the moment of filing we do not know if
that order will be made. To account for this timing problem, the legislation
provides that the caveat is valid as long as the agreement has not been
breached by the claiming party, and provided some other valid reason for
vacating the caveat is not proven." In other words, a caveat is tenable
because an interest in land is presumed even before it is known whether or
not specific performance will issue.

10. Howardv Miller, [1915] AC 318, 22 DLR 75 (PC). See also bclMC ConstructionFund Corp
v Chandler Homer Street Ventures Ltd, 2008 BCSC 897, 2008 CarswellBC 1421, and the authorities
cited there.
11. Adderley v Dixon (1824), 1 Sim & St 607, 57 ER 239 (Ch).
12. See further text accompanying notes 29 to 31, infra.
13. Land Titles Act, RSA 2000, L-4, s 130 [LTA].
14. Ibid at s 143.
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Consider also a situation in which a judgment creditor tries to execute
against land of a judgment debtor. It is axiomatic that a creditor may only
seize that which belongs to the debtor and no more." Assume that prior
to the filing of the writ of enforcement, the debtor had agreed to sell the
property to a third party. That agreement can, as we have just seen, give
rise to an equitable interest in the property in favour of the purchaser. If
so, the judgment debtor's interest in the land is diminished accordingly,
leaving the judgment creditor without recourse to the land. However, at
the time that the writ attached, the so-called prior equitable interest was
dependent upon the prospect that specific performance would issue in the
future, an outcome that is unknown until a court so orders.
Such a scenario occurred in Martin Commercial Fueling Inc. v.
Virtanen.16 There, the court was called upon to consider whether or not a
writ of execution had priority over an unregisteredequitable entitlement
that arose when the judgment debtor sold the property to a third party.
The sale occurred on TI but was not registered. The writ was lodged at
T2. It was held that the sale to the third party did in fact encumber the
land, and took precedence over the writ. The sale trumped the writ even
though when the writ was registered, the agreement was not on title, andof greater importance here-despite the fact that one could not be certain
specific performance would ever be granted.
2. Common law and equitable damages
On breach, an innocent party may seek performance on breach of contract
and/or may opt to claim for damages. When common law damages are
sought, the normal reference point for quantification is the date of breach.
One looks to the difference between the agreed-to-price and the market
value of the property on that date. If the market has risen, the plaintiff is
entitled to that increase. Measuring damages in this way is premised on
the idea that the plaintiff, in the face of a breach, will (should) look for
another property at that point. If it now costs more to acquire a like parcel,
the defendant must make up the discrepancy in damages."
A plaintiff might also have a claim to equitable damages. Where
specific performance is otherwise available, a court of equity is permitted
to order damages in lieu of performance. Here the presumptive reference
date for determining the quantum is the date at which the remedy of

15.
16.
17.

Jellettv Wilkie (1896), 26 SCR 282, 1896 CarswellNWT 46.
(1997), 144 DLR (4th) 290, 1997 CarswellBC 600 (CA).
For a textbook example, see Chai v Dabir, 2015 ONSC 1327, 2015 CarswellOnt 2857.
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performance could have been ordered, i.e., at trial or at the point when the
request for performance is abandoned or is no longer tenable."
These two damages-based claims are, in theory, distinct, and can give
rise to different awards. It must be cautioned, however, that the distinction
here between law and equity is not necessarily that marked. In the modem
era, the courts may determine that the fairest approach is to set common
law damages in the same manner in which damages in equity might be
determined.19 In other words, it is possible for a court to assess common
law damages as at the date of trial where that would yield an appropriate
result.
II. Semelhago and its aftermath
1. The decision
The facts in Semelhago are unremarkable. In 1986, S agreed to purchase a
house under construction from P. When the closing date arrived, P reneged
on the deal. Several weeks later, he transferred the house to his wife. S
sued, seeking damages in lieu of specific performance. Throughout the
period, S remained in his original house.
It was conceded by counsel for the defendant (P) that specific
performance was an available remedy under the circumstances. But S did
not seek performance. He wanted equitable damages instead. The dispute
concerned the quantum of damages to be awarded to the disappointed
purchaser in lieu of performance. Five years had passed between the
time of breach and the trial, and during that time the purchaser's existing
home had itself appreciated in value. Given that, it was arguable that the
purchaser had suffered no real loss, and that any award of damages would
constitute a windfall.
The Supreme Court held that S was entitled to recover the difference
between the agreed sale price of the second home and that home's value at
the time of trial. Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority, stated that the
calculation of damages need not take into account the increase in value of
the plaintiff's retained home. Moreover, damages were to be measured as
at the date of trial, for only then could the award be a true equivalent of an
order for specific performance. In the course of this analysis, Sopinka J.
reflected on the significance of the uniqueness of the subject property when
performance is being sought. Those comments now form the foundation of

Inmet Mining Corp v Homestake CanadaInc, 2003 BCCA 610.
19. See P Perell, "Common Law Damages, Specific Performance and Equitable Compensation in an
Abortive Contract for the Sale of Land: A Synopsis" (2011) 37 Adv Q 408 at 415. But see the caution
inDosanjh v Liang, 2015 BCCA 18, 2015 CarswellBC 40.
18.
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the law governing specific performance for real estate contracts in Canada.
Here they are in full:
While at one time the common law regarded every piece of real
estate to be unique, with the progress of modem real estate development
this is no longer the case. Both residential, business and industrial
properties are mass produced much in the same way as other consumer
products. If a deal falls through for one property, another is frequently,
though not always, readily available.
It is no longer appropriate,therefore, to maintain a distinctionin the
approach to specific performance as between realty and personalty. It
cannot be assumed that damagesfor breach of contractfor the purchase
and sale of real estate will be an inadequate remedy in all cases. The
common law recognized that the distinction might not be valid when the
land had no peculiar or special value. InAdderley v. Dixon (1824)... Sir
John Leach, VC., stated (at p. 240):
Courts of Equity decree the specific performance of contracts,
not upon any distinction between realty and personalty, but
because damages at law may not, in the particular case, afford a
complete remedy. Thus a Court of Equity decrees performance
of a contract for land, not because of the real nature of the land,
but because damages at law, which must be calculated upon
the general money value of the land, may not be a complete
remedy to the purchaser, to whom the land may have a peculiar
and special value.
Courts have tended, however, to simply treat all real estate as being
unique and to decree specific performance unless there was some other
reason for refusing equitable relief. . . Some courts, however, have
begun to question the assumption that damages will afford an inadequate
remedy for breach of contract for the purchase of land. In Chaulk v.
Fairview Construction Ltd.... the Newfoundland Court of Appeal[,]...
after quoting the above passage from Adderley v. Dixon, stated...:
The question here is whether damages would have afforded
Chaulk an adequate remedy, and I have no doubt that they
could, and would, have. There was nothing whatever unique or
irreplaceable about the houses and lots bargained for. They were
merely subdivision lots with houses, all of the same general
design, built on them, which the respondent was purchasing for
investment or re-sale purposes only. He had sold the first two
almost immediately at a profit, and intended to do the same with
the remainder. It would be quite different if we were dealing
with a house or houses which were of a particular architectural
design, or were situated in a particularly desirable location, but
this was certainly not the case.
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Specific performance should, therefore, not be granted as a matter of
course absent evidence that the property is unique to the extent that
its substitute would not be readily available. The guideline proposed
by Estey J. in Baud Corp., N. V v. Brook... with respect to contracts
involving chattels is equally applicable to real property. . . :
Before a plaintiff can rely on a claim to specific performance
so as to insulate himself from the consequences of failing to
procure alternate property in mitigation of his losses, some fair,
real and substantial justification for his claim to performance
must be found.20

Since the appropriateness of specific performance in this case was
not put in issue, Sopinka J.'s comments were obiter dictum. Even so, the
principle has been followed consistently by lower courts in Canada.2 1
2.

The currenttest for specific performance

In one sense, Semelhago changed little. Equitable remedies are always
discretionary; that being so, no particular outcome is available as of right.
Equity will demand, among other things, that a party seeking relief must
come with clean hands and be prepared to do equity if the circumstances
require as much. The old law always treated damages as the default
remedy, though for land it was assumed that money would normally not
do. 22 However, even in the pre-Semelhago era, an order for performance
was occasionally denied on the basis that the subject property was not
unique and that damages would serve as a suitable remedy. 23 Given this
background, the change ushered in by Semelhago can be seen as one of
degree, not principle.
The current law is not described uniformly in the case law. Three kinds
of formulations can be found:
Statement #1 (from Semelhago): "Specific performance should... not be
granted as a matter of course absent evidence that the property is unique
24
to the extent that its substitute would not be readily available."
Statement #2: To be entitled to an order for specific performance it
20. Semelhago, supra note 2 at paras 20-22 (Sopinka J) [emphasis added].
21. "[The statement inSemelhago] is obiter of the highest order. There is obiter and there is obiter.
Some ha[ve] a lot more weight than others": Corse v Ravenwood Homes Ltd (1998), 226 AR 214 at
para 15 (Master Funduk).
22.

Roy v Kloepfer Wholesale Hardware& Automotive Co, [1952] 2 SCR 465.

23. McNabb v Smith (1981), 124 DLR (3d) 547, 1981 CarswellBC 186 (SC) aff'd (1982), 44 BCLR
295, 1982 CarswellBC 405 (CA); Domowicz v Orsa Investments Ltd, 1993 CarswellOnt 1860, 15
OR (3d) 661 (Gen Div); Chaulk v Fairview Construction Ltd (1977), 14 Nfid & PEIR 13, 1977
CarswellNfid 12 (CA); Zalaudekv De Boer (1981), 33 BCLR 57, 1981 CarswellBC 351 (SC); Heron
Bay Investments Ltd v Peel-ElderDevelopments Ltd, 1976 CarswellOnt 355 (HC).

24.

Semelhago, supra note 2 at para 22 (Sopinka J).
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must be shown that "(1) the subject property is unique and a substitute
is not readily available; (2) the remedy of damages is comparatively
inadequate to do justice; and (3) the plaintiff has established a fair, real,
and substantial justification for the claim of specific performance. "25
Statement #3: "The.. fundamental question is whether the plaintiff has
shown that the land rather than its monetary equivalent better serves
justice between the parties. This will [often] depend on whether money
is an adequate substitute for the plaintiff's loss and this in turn will
[often] depend on whether the subject matter of the contract is generic
or unique.26

These three statements bear strong similarities, though they also
contain important differences. In my view, the first two statements are
inadequate, and the third formulation reflects a proper statement of the
current law. I discount the first two formulations because they both give
undue prominence to the element of uniqueness. Both suggest that proof of
uniqueness is essential if performance is to be ordered. In fact, uniqueness
is not a necessary basis on which to decide whether specific performance
should issue. Moreover, in some cases uniqueness will not be sufficient to
warrant that order.
Under the current law, uniqueness is not a necessary basis for ordering
specific performance because even if the property is a purely fungible
unit, damages may not serve the ends of justice. That would be so in at
least three instances. First, damages may be difficult to compute. If the
land in issue is not unique, it would normally be possible to ascertain its
value by examining other comparable properties. Still, life is not always
as accommodating. Rational disagreements can emerge about current
valuations that would require considerable time and effort to resolve. 27

25.

Canamed (Stamford) Ltd v Masterwood Doors Ltd, 2006 CarswellOnt 1183, 41 RPR (4th) 90

(SCJ) at para 103 (McMahon J). See also the three-prong test offered in 686966 BC Ltd v 686967
BC Ltd, 2007 BCSC 1137, 2007 CarswellBC 1759 at para 18 (Wilson J): (i) is there evidence that
the land is especially suitable for the purchaser? (ii) is there evidence that a substitute is not "readily
available"? and (iii) are damages "comparatively inadequate" to do justice? See also Hayward v
Bennett, 2010 BCSC 1465, 2010 CarswellBC 2814.
26.

John E Dodge HoldingsLtd v 805062 OntarioLtd, 2001 CarswellOnt 3984, 46 RPR (3d) 239

(SCJ) aff'd 2003 CarswellOnt 342, 10 RPR (4th) 98 (CA) leave to appeal to the SCC refused: 2003
CarswellOnt 4375 at para 55 (Lax J, SCJ). For reasons explained below, I have added the word "often"
twice to the quoted passage. See also 101090442 Saskatchewan Ltd v Harle, 2014 SKCA 6, 2014
CarswellSask 10; Neighbourhoods of Cornell Inc v 1440106 Ontario Inc, 2003 CarswellOnt 2757, 11

RPR (4th) 294 (SCJ); RaymondvRaymondEstate, 2011 SKCA 58, 2011 CarswellSask 336.
27.

CantiniDevelopments Ltd v Hi-Rise Group (Toronto) Inc, 2013 ONSC 186, 2013 CarswellOnt

205; Mondino v Mondino, 2004 CarswellOnt 1072, 18 RPR (4th) 200 (SCJ). See also the obiter
comments in Neighbourhoods of Cornell Inc v 1440106 Ontario Inc, ibid; PJ Brenner, "Specific

Performance of Contracts for the Sale of Land Purchased for Resale or Investment" (1978) 24 McGill
LJ 513 at 546 and Southcott EstatesInc v Toronto CatholicDistrictSchool Bd, supra note 8 atpara 40.
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The market may be so volatile that fixing the value of the property may
lead to significant over- or under-valuation.2 8
Secondly, as already noted, specific performance is a discretionary
remedy,2 9 and equity is attentive to the conduct of both parties whenever
equitable reliefis being sought. Where a defendant is guilty of inappropriate
conduct (beyond a mere breach of contract), the scales of justice may tip
in favour of an order of specific performance against that party.3 0 This
discretion may be exercized in favour of a defaulting vendor even where no
wrongdoing is involved, such as where denying an order for performance
would have left the contracting parties as co-owners.3 1
Thirdly, a damages award may not be of practical value if the vendor is
unable to satisfy the judgment. It has been questioned whether a vendor's
insolvency is or is not a valid reason for concluding that damages are
inadequate.3 2 The concern is that to order performance in that situation
would give the purchaser an unfair preference over unsecured creditors of
the insolvent vendor. Even if that is good law, there are other instances in
which a monetary award can be a hollow victory.3 3 The land in issue may
be the only exigible asset of an otherwise solvent vendor. Or the vendor's
principal exigible assets may be in another jurisdiction, so that execution
against those properties would be difficult and expensive.3 4
By the same token, uniqueness is not necessarily enough to support the
granting of an order of specific performance. As already noted, equitable
relief may be denied where it is the plaintiff who has engaged in improper
conduct, or where the plaintiff is guilty of delay (laches)3 5 or acquiescence

28. Amar vMatthew, 2010 BCSC 508, 2010 CarswellBC 893; Sihota v Soo, 2010 BCSC 886, 2010
CarswellBC 1607.
29.
30.

Beier v ProperCat ConstructionLtd, 2013 CarswellAlta 141, 2013 ABQB 351 atpara 80.
Mondino v Mondino, supra note 27. See also Landmark of Thornhill Ltd v Jacobson (1995), 25

OR (3d) 628, 1995 CarswellOnt 408 (CA).
31.

Mondino vMondino, ibid.

32.

See further RJ Sharpe, Injunctionsand Specific Performance, 4th ed (Aurora, ON: Canada Law

Book, 2012) at para 7.260ff. See also 410675 Alberta Ltd v Trail South Developments Inc, 2001

ABCA 274, 2001 CarswellAlta 1405, leave to appeal to the SCC refused: 2002 CarswellAlta 696 on
which it was argued that specific performance should be available because the defendant had no other
assets apart from the land in issue to satisfy the breach. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument
on the basis that the authorities cited by the plaintiff "support[ed] the proposition that a plaintiff's
potential inability to collect damages from a defendant is an adequate basis for specific performance.
Such an argument confuses the remedy of specific performance with interlocutory injunctive relief,
or pre-judgment execution, neither of which are being sought": ibid at para 20 (per curiam). There
was no suggestion that the defendant in Trailwas insolvent, though that might have been true. But see
Mylonas EntrprisesLtd v Foundation Place Inc, 2013 CarswellAlta 1169, 2013 ABQB 385 (vendor
insolvent).
33. Sihota v Soo, supra note 28.

34.

Soo v Law, 2009 BCSC 1041, 2009 CarswellBC 2063.

35.

370866 OntarioLtd v Chizy (1987), 57 OR (2d) 587 (HC); Zalaudek v De Boer, supra note 23.
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that results in appreciable hardship on the defendant.3 6 Equity will not
order performance where to do so would affect certain third parties, most
prominently, the bona fide purchaser for value of a legal interest without
notice of the prior equitable right of the purchaser.3 7 Equity will also refuse
specific performance where ongoing supervision of the contract might be
necessary.3 8
Hence, the third formulation of the three in circulation is superior.
The primary question is whether damages will suffice to meet the ends
of justice. In that determination, the uniqueness of the property is one
consideration among others, albeit often the most important factor.
3. The meaning of uniqueness
Like snowflakes and fingerprints, all properties can be described as
unique. No two parcels can occupy the same physical space on the globe.
However, that kind of uniqueness will not suffice to render a property
special in this context, for otherwise the issue would lose all significance.
Yet we also know that uniqueness does not mean that that the plaintiff
must show that the property is one of a kind. The property need not be
shown to be "incomparable." 3 9 Instead, the property must be unique "to
the extent that its substitute would not be readily available."" In essence,
the cases have asked whether the property possesses such qualities that
finding a suitable substitute is rendered difficult (though not necessarily
impossible). Uniqueness, then, is a matter of degree, about which rational
disagreements can anse.
The purchaser might truly believe that the property is her or his
"dream home."" But that is not enough. Uniqueness is regarded as

36.

Bowser v Prager, [1999] OJ No 1438 (SCJ); Zalaudek v De Boer, supra note 23; Cf Cimon

v Arthur, 2006 CarswellOnt 2642 (CA) aff'g 2005 CaswellOnt 8666 (SCJ); Beier v Proper Cat
ConstructionLtd, supra note 29. In general, hardship to the defendant is to be weighed against the
reasonable expectations of the plaintiff that the contractbe fulfilled: Zhang v Soong, 2012 BCSC 758,
2012 CarswellBC 1495. Cf Cimon v Arthur, 2006 CarswellOnt 2642 (CA) aff'g 2005 CarswellOnt
8666 (SCJ).
37.

See e.g. Munn v Worden, 1997 CarswellNB 172 (QB). InRoberge v 1102940Alberta Ltd, 2012

ABQB 717, 2012 CarswellAlta 2258, the court was prepared to recognise the hardship to a subsequent
purchaser who acquired the property with notice of the plaintiff's claimed interest (via a caveat) as
an additional reason to deny specific performance. (Uniqueness had not been proven.) The third party
had spent money improving the property. See also Lalani v Wenn Estate, 2011 BCCA 499, 2011
CarswellBC 3230.
38. See generally, Sharpe, supra note 32 at para 7.340ff.
39.
40.

John E Dodge Holdings Ltd v 805062 OntarioLtd, supra note 26 at para 60 (Lax J).
Semelhago, supra note 2 at para 22.

41. As in Kelly v Dosch, 2003 CarswellOnt 330, 8 RPR (4th) 306 (SCJ) (specific performance
denied).
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having subjective and objective facets.42 The subjective element means
that the purchaser actually viewed the property as unique at the time of
contracting,43 and presumably also at trial. Of course we know intuitively
that the property is special to that party because they have not only entered
into a contract to acquire that very parcel, but they have also responded to a
breach of contract by suing for performance. That being so, the subjective
feature seems superfluous and unhelpful. Nevertheless, subjectivity serves
to frame the inquiry as to objective uniqueness. External circumstances
must demonstrate objectively that another property is not readily available
to serve that purpose."4 Here the questions become (i) what features of the
property mattered to the purchaser, making it particularly suitable for the
purpose for which it was purchased? and (ii) can those features be found
elsewhere?" So, a house with a ravine lot is often viewed as especially
desirable. However, should the purchaser concede that it is the home's
Tudor-style architecture that provides the special ingredient, the focus of
objective uniqueness must relate solely to that feature.
The inquiry into whether a property meets the uniqueness criterion is
very fact dependent.46 However, it does not take a real estate agent to know
that three of the most important factors leading to a finding of uniqueness
are-location, location, location. Turning to the case law offers some
guidance." For example, the criterion has been satisfied where the subject
property is situated near lands that the purchaser already owns, at least
when there is a use-nexus between those parcels and the property in

42. John E Dodge Holdings Ltd v 805062 Ontario Ltd, supra note 26 at para 59 (SCJ); Greenforco
Holding Corp v Yonge-Merton Development Ltd, [1999] OJ No 3232 (SCJ) aff'd 2000 CarswellOnt

3468 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused: 2001 CarswellOnt 1807; Ali v 656527 BC Ltd, 2004
BCCA 350, 29 BCLR (4th) 206.
43.

Roberge v 1102940 Alberta Ltd, supra note 37.

44. "[T]he test is primarily an objective one": de Franco v Khatri, 2004 CarswellOnt 9767 (SCJ) at
para 3 (Lax J).
45. John E Dodge Holdings Ltdv 805062 OntarioLtd, supra note 26; 1534818 Alberta Ltd v Tissot
Management Ltd, 2011 ABQB 975.
46. United GulfDevelopments Ltd v Iskandar, 2004 NSCA 35, 222 NSR (2d) 137.
47. As in Dryer v Petersen, 2010 BCSC 1221, 2010 CarswellBC 2298. See also Kyriacopoulos v

Fitzgerald, 2009 CarswellOnt 3328, 82 RPR (4th) 308 (SCJ).
48. See further M Moore, "Damages and Specific Performance: A Tale of Two Remedies" (2011) 2
RPR (5th) 175.
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issue.4 9 Uniqueness may be found when the property is close to amenities
that are of considerable importance to the purchaser"o (such as a school"
or a mosque5). A house on a ravine lot, especially where it was custom
built, would qualify.5 3 In the right circumstances, even a vacant lot can be

-

unique.
A property may have unique features even if its locale is quite ordinary.
Such was the case where the property was a former school building," or
was a beautiful rural parcel that was suitable for pasturing horses.5 6 Other
circumstances have also been found to be germane, such as where a buyer
lawfully enters into possession prior to the closing and undertakes work
on the property," or where a purchaser acquires a house next door for
the express purpose of getting rid of the neighbour who is living there.
One would think that where the contract deems the property to be unique
and where they have stipulated that performance may be sought, such a
term should be controlling, at least if it is not unreasonable or otherwise
unenforceable.5 9
A distinction is sometimes drawn between residential and commercial
properties. Hence, it has been suggested that the subjective aspect is more
salient when the home-often a family's most important purchase 6 0

49.

Balderston v Faul, 2014 ABQB 762, 2014 CarswellAlta 2305; 645396AlbertaLtd v Lapointe,

2014 ABQB 60, 2014 CarswellAlta 157; 0737631 BCLtdvMason, 2009 BCSC 272, 2009 CarswellBC
486. See also 532782 BC Inc v Republic FinancialLtd, 2001 ABQB 581, 2001 CarswellAlta 912;
2475813 Nova Scotia Ltd v Lundrigan, 2003 NSSC 48, 213 NSR (2d) 53; Deacon v Barron, 2008
BCSC 1249, 2008 CarswellBC 2833; Sheetharbour Offshore Development Inc v Tusket Mining Inc,
2007 NSCA 59, 2007 CarswellNS 210; 1072456 Ontario Ltd v Ernst & Young Inc (1997), 10 CPC

(4th) 351 (Ont SCJ, Master); Fossum v Vsual Developments Ltd, 1997 CarswellAlta 1257 (QB);
Covlin vMinhas, 2009 ABCA 404, 2009 CarswellAlta 1948. InKaler v Scales, 2009 BCSC 457, 2009
CarswellBC 859, the purchaser's interest in purchasing nearby properties inthe future for the purposes
of land assembly was a factor supporting a claim of uniqueness.
50. CantiniDevelopments Ltd v Hi-Rise Group (Toronto) Inc, 2013 ONSC 186, 2013 CarswellOnt
205; Amar v Matthew, supra note 28.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Johnson v Benjamin, 2012 NLTD(G) 51, 2012 CarswellNfid 117.
Siddiqui vMir, 2005 CarswellOnt 7592, 47 RPR (4th) 137 (SCJ).
Tropianov Stonevalley Estates Inc (1997), 36 OR (3d) 92, 1997 CarswellOnt 5636 (Gen Div).
Roppo v Avvro Developments Inc, 2006 CarswellOnt 1306, 41 RPR (4th) 20 (SCJ). See also

0771252 BC Ltd v 0764735 BC Ltd, 2012 BCSC 2039, 2012 CarswellBC 4219.
55. Crichton CulturalCommunity Centrev School ofDance (Ottawa) Pre-ProfessionalProgramme

Inc, 2004 CarswellOnt 1560, 20 RPR (4th) 240 (SCJ).
56. CormackvHarwardt, 1998 CarswellBC 2458, [1998] BCJNo 2684 (SC); Stefan vLichter, 2005
SKQB 383, 270 Sask R 124 (QB).
57.

656340 NB Inc v 059143 NB Inc, 2013 CarswellNB 312, 2013 CarswellNB 484; McDonald v

McDonald, 2011 MBQB 241, 2011 CarswellMan 515.
58.
59.

Beier v ProperCat ConstructionLtd, supra note 29.
Muhammadv Canlanka Ventures Ltd, 2015 ABQB 145, 2015 CarswellAlta 349.

60.

Chan v Tu, 2006 BCSC 934, 2006 CarswellBC 1519 at para 23.
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is involved.6 1 At the same time, it is appreciated that some homes may
lack sufficient distinctiveness. Condo unit #203 may not differ in any
material way from condo units #202 and #204. The same might be true
of two cookie-cutter homes in a new residential development. Likewise,
some commercial properties may possess highly distinctive attributes. 6 2
Accordingly, there is no bright-line distinction between residential and
commercial properties.
Another dichotomy focuses on whether or not the land-residential or
commercial-is being acquired for use and occupation or as an investment.
Hence, a property acquired for quarrying,6 or lumber64 is a candidate for
unique status, whereas a house bought with a view to a prompt re-sale is
not. However, this dividing line is also imperfect. Some investments are
complex and involve a long-term plan. In such instances, a court may find
it very difficult to pinpoint the proper measure of damages.65 This might
be seen as a problem of the adequacy of damages. Although little turns on
this distinction, it may equally be seen as a matter of uniqueness. One asks
whether another property can be found that can be plugged into the plan,
as one component among many, to yield the same profit later on.
4. The onus ofproof
General principles governing proof in civil matters mandate that in a
contract dispute a disappointed party must demonstrate the breach of
a valid agreement. If specific performance is sought, the plaintiff must
also be ready, willing, and able to close the deal, and show that damages
are inadequate to meet the ends of justice. As we have just seen, under
Semelhago that latter issue often imposes an onus on the purchaser to
prove that the property is unique, such that a replacement is not readily
available.6 6 In short, the burden of proving uniqueness rests with the
plaintiff. The time for that determination is at breach. At that point,

61.

Mondino v Mondino, supra note 27; Marvost v Stokes, 2011 ONSC 4827, 2011 CarswellOnt

8105.
62. See e.g. Balderstonv Faul, supra note 49; 1534818Alberta Ltd v TissotManagementLtd, 2011
ABQB 75, 2011 CarswellAlta 144; Roma Construction Ltd v Excel Venture ManagementInc, 2007
ABQB 396, 2007 CarswellAlta 820; 2329131 Ontario Inc v Carlyle Development Corp, 2013 ONSC
4876, 2013 CarswellOnt 11657; 11 Suntract HoldingsLtd v ChassisService & Hydraulics Ltd, 1997

CarswellOnt 4804, 36 OR (3d) 328 (GenDiv).
63.
64.

See e.g. Erie Sand & Gravel Ltd v Seres'FarmsLtd, 2009 ONCA 709, 2009 CarswellOnt 6035.
Cross Creek Timber TradersInc v St John Terminals Ltd, 2002 NBQB 79, 2002 CarswellNB 80,

discussed in JW Lem & GE Henderson, Annotation (2002), 49 RPR (3d) 83.
65.

See e.g. SoleilHotel & SuitesLtdv SoleilManagementInc, 2009 BCSC 1303, 2009 CarswellBC

2553.
66. See Part II, 2, supra.
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the plaintiff must decide whether to terminate the contract and sue for
damages, or to keep the contract alive and seek performance.67
It is sometimes said that the post-Semelhago law has not gone so
far as to replace the presumption of uniqueness with the presumption
of replaceability.68 It has also been offered that Canadian law now
treats the issue as a matter to be determined by taking account of all
of the circumstances.69 I find such statements to be unhelpful. Prior to
Semelhago there was a strong presumption that real property was unique
and therefore a proper subject for specific performance. However, it was
a rebuttable presumption, and, as already noted, one can find cases in
which specific performance was denied by reason of lack of uniqueness."
After Semelhago, there is a presumption of replaceability, though it too is
rebuttable. We know this is so because if no evidence is tendered on the
issue of uniqueness, specific performance should be denied." The same
result should obtain if no search is made for a suitable substitute.72
Requiring the plaintiff to show uniqueness casts upon that party the
need to prove a negative, i.e., that there is no substitute property. 73 If We
were to take the requirement of proving this negative to an extreme, we
would ask the plaintiff to locate and consider all relevant properties on the
market, and then to discount each and every one as a viable alternative. All
the while the defendant would be required to do nothing. That party need
not provide a list of properties that could serve as an adequate substitute.
It might point to certain locations, alleging only that the properties within
that area have not been proven by the plaintiff to be unsuitable.
There is, however, a built-in limiting element to the plaintiff's
seemingly impossible task. It must be shown that a substitute was not
readily available. That implies an element of practicality to the plaintiff's
burden. It has been observed that the law does not require the purchaser to
look high and low for all listed and unlisted properties. 74 Rather, there is,
67.
68.

John E Dodge HoldingsLtd v 805062 OntarioLtd, supra note 26 at para 57 (SCJ).
904060 OntarioLtdv 529566 Ontario Ltd, 1999 CarswellOnt 378 (SCJ) at para 14 (Low J).

69.

Turner, supra note 9 at 604. See also Matthew Brady Self-Storage Corp v InStorage Limited

Partnership,2014 ONCA 858, 2014 CarswellOnt 16809 at para 35.
70. See supra text accompanying note 23.
71. See e.g. United GulfDevelopments Ltd v Iskandal, 2003 NSCA 83, 2003 CarswellNS 300. See
also Poirierv DiamondKey Homes Ltd, 2009 ABQB 139, 2009 CarswellAlta 345 (Master).
72. Li vAu, 2006 BCSC 671, 2006 CarswellBC 1008. But see Phelps HoldingsLtdv StrataPlan VIS
3430, 2010 BCSC 870, 2010 CarswellBC 1513 atpara 22, where the property in issue was found to be
unique even though the plaintiff provided no evidence as to other sites. See also Ali v 656527 BC Ltd,
2004 BCCA 350, 29 BCLR (4th) 206.
73. Simmons v Skinner, 2007 BCSC 2007, 75 CarswellBC 75.
74.

GreenforcoHolding Corpv Yonge-Merton Development Ltd, supra note 42. See also Parsonage

v OperationsNorth (1999) Ltd, 2014 ABQB 675, 2014 CarswellAlta 2028.
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it would seem, some notional requirement of due diligence. Moreover, in
appropriate cases, proof of an extensive search for properties prior to the
purchase in question will satisfy this requirement.7 1
The issue of uniqueness can arise in interlocutory proceedings, that
is, before a full-blown trial of the dispute. For instance, the viability of
a claim for specific performance can be challenged by a defendant in an
application for summary judgment. In this setting, it is the defendant who
bears the persuasive burden. Where summary judgment is sought, the
defendant (as moving party) must prove that there is no genuine issue for
trial. 76 If there is a realistic chance that the plaintiff will succeed (in this
case in obtaining an order for specific performance), summary judgment
should be refused.7 7
Summary proceedings may also be invoked in another way to bring
the issue of specific performance to the fore prior to trial. Proceedings may
be brought to discharge a caveat or certificate of pending litigation. For
example, as already noted,"7 in Alberta a caveat may be lodged claiming,
inter alia, an equitable interest under an agreement for sale. 79 The Registrar
cannot lawfully refuse to record the caveat on the ground that the interest
claimed is not recognized as such in law, or that the caveator does not in
fact hold the interest being claimed. By the same token, the filing of a
caveat in no way validates the interest claimed. It serves as notice only.
Alternatively, a litigant may submit a lis pendens, commonly called a
certificate of pending litigation, which is designed to provide notice that a
claim to an interest in land in being asserted in legal proceedings.8 0
Given that there is little filtering of caveats or lis pendens claims at
the moment of registration, there needs to be some process to contest

75.

Silverberg v 1054384 OntarioLtd, 2008 CarswellOnt 6772, 77 RPR (4th) 102 (SCJ). CfMcVea v

Bennett, 2008 BCSC 700, 2008 CarswellBC 1129. See also Spicer v Gambell, 2005 ABQB 646, 2005
CarswellAlta 1172; Gillespie v 1766998 Ontario Inc, 2014 ONSC 6952, 2014 CarswellOnt 16888.
76. 1174538 Ontario Ltd v Barzel Windsor (1984) Inc, 1999 CarswellOnt 4482, 29 RPR (3d) 256
(SCJ); Konjevic v Horvat PropertiesLtd, 1998 CarswellOnt 2809, 40 OR (3d) 633 (CA); Hunter
Square Developments Inc v 351658 Ontario Ltd, 2002 CarswellOnt 2341, 1 RPR (4th) 245 (SCJ);
North America Construction (1993) Ltd v Deem ManagementServices Ltd, 2008 CarswellOnt 5092,
73 RPR (4th) 253 (SCJ); Earthworks 2000Design Group Inc v SpectacularInvestments (Canada) Inc,

2005 BCSC 22, 2005 CarswellBC 9.
77. Nisheu EnterprisesLtd v FriendlyAuto Body & Repair Ltd, 2010 ABQB 8 (Master); Amnor Ltd
v 923862 Alberta Ltd, 2010 ABQB 236, 29 Alta LR (5th) 57; FairwaysProject Ltd v Melander, 2011
ABQB 6, 2011 CarswellAlta 148; Konjevic v Horvat, supra note 76; North America Construction
(1993) LtdvDeem ManagementServices Ltd, 2008 CarswellOnt 5092, 73 RPR (4th) 253 (SCJ); VendAll MarketingInc v Silverberg Estate, 2014 MBQB 11, 2014 CarswellMan 45; 904060 Ontario Ltd v
529566 OntarioLtd, 1999 CarswellOnt 378; de Franco v Khatri, supra note 44.

78.
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80.
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the validity of recorded caveats. Under statute, a motion can be brought
requiring the filing party to prove the interest claimed. In such proceedings
the onus rests with the caveating/filing party. Summary judgment may
then be sought by the contesting party. To succeed at this stage, whether
there is a challenge to a caveat or a lis pendens, the purchaser must make
out only a prima facie case supporting an interest in land. Put another way,
the motion to discharge will be dismissed unless it is plain and obvious
that a claim to specific performance will ultimately fail were the matter to
proceed to trial."
5. Specific performance sought by vendors
In some instances, it is the vendor who will seek specific performance, even
though what is being sought by that party is a money payment (the agreed
purchase price). The advantage for a vendor in asking for performance is
that, if ordered, the entire purchase price can thereby be recovered (plus
incidental losses). In contrast, when the claim is for damages for breach,
recovery is based on a real or presumed sale of the property by the vendor,
so that damages are limited to the difference between the price agreed to in
the original contract, and the real or projected proceeds of a later sale. Even
though in these cases the vendor is seeking money, the ultimate fungible,

81. 1244034 Alberta Ltd v Walton InternationalGroup Inc, 2007 ABCA 372, 2007 CarswellAlta
1562. See also Lamont (Town) vJabneelDevelopmentInc, 2014 ABQB 328, 2014 CarswellAlta 886;
Festival City Holdings Ltd v Worthington PropertiesInc, 2002 ABQB 543, 2002 CarswellAlta 721

(Master); De Sena vAllure Homes Ltd, 2002 ABQB 561, 2002 CarswellAlta 763 (Master); McMurray
ImperialEnterprisesLtd v Brimstone Acquisitions & Asset ManagementInc, 1997 CarswellAlta 862,
210 AR 97 (Master); Sandmore Antiques InternationalLtd v 1292770Alberta Ltd, 2007 ABQB 664,
2007 CarswellAlta 1648. See also Youyi Group Holdings (Canada)Ltd v Brentwood Lanes Canada
Ltd, 2014 BCCA 388; 0624708 BC Ltd v Wallace, 2011 BCSC 1383, 2011 CarswellBC 2803; Infini-T
HoldingsLtdv BellAliant Regional CommunicationsInc, 2010 NLSCTD(G) 205, 2010 CarswellNfid
410; Kansun Homes (Toronto) Ltd v TransnationalPlaza Corp, 2003 CarswellOnt 2815 (Master);
1376273 Ontario Inc v Woods Property Development Inc, 2001 CarswellOnt 2191, 43 RPR (3d) 19

(Master); St Onge v Willowbay Investments Inc, 2008 CarswellOnt 5133, 73 RPR (4th) 294. See
also McGrath v BG Schickendanz Homes Inc (2000), 56 OR (3d) 34, 2000 CarswellOnt 3990 (SCJ);
CartteraManagement Inc v Palm Holdings CanadaInc, 2011 ONSC 4573, 2011 CarswellOnt 7233

(order granting the right to file a certificate of pending litigation). In Klimp v Meinema, 2015 ABQB
204, 2015 CarswellAlta 540 (Master) at para 25, Master Schlosser proposed the following description
of the requisite standard: "To put it in terms of numbers, the court need be satisfied that there is
an eighty percent chance (or thereabouts) that the plaintiffs won't prove an entitlement to specific
performance on the balance of probabilities at trial."
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the courts continue to premise the availability of specific performance on
the basis of uniqueness.8 2
It has been offered that the uniqueness qua vendor does not relate
to the property as such, but to the transaction as a whole.8 3 It might be
the case, for example, that the vendor acquired and renovated the land to
meet the specifications of the purchaser, under circumstances in which
the vendor had no personal use for the premises as modified, and the
specialized nature of the building would be of value to few other buyers.
If these predicates are in place, it is reasoned, the transaction is unique and
an order for specific performance is warranted."
6. Summary of the current law
The decision in Semelhago realigned the law governing the availability
of specific performance. In the wake of the decision, the basic rules are as
follows:
At trial, a plaintiff, whether purchaser or vendor, seeking specific
performance must prove that:
1. There has been a breach of a valid contract, and that the
plaintiff is ready, willing, and able to complete the transaction.
2. Damages would not be an adequate remedy. That can be
shown by demonstrating any one of the following:
(i) The property is unique to the extent that a substitute
is not readily available;
(ii) The proper measure of damages is too difficult to
calculate;
(iii) There is a reasonable prospect that an award of
damages would not be satisfied; or
(iv) Any other consideration that might motivate a court
of equity to grant the order.
Even if these requirements are met, a defendant may resist an
order for specific performance where it can be proven that:
1. The order would give rise to undue hardship on the
defendant or to a third party; or
82.

See e.g. Matthew Brady Self Storage Corp v InStorage Limited Partnership, supra note 69;

Moore v Walker, 2001 BCSC 1119, 2001 CarswellBC 1741; Taylorv Sturgeon, 1996 CarswellNS 552,
12 RPR (3d) 107 (SC); Hoover v Mark Minor Homes Inc, 1998 CarswellOnt 3187, 75 OTC 165 (Gen
Div). See e.g. Comet Investments Ltd v Northwind Logging Ltd (1998), 22 RPR (3d) 294 (BCSC);
ColonnadeDevelopment Inc v Canada (NationalCapitalCommission), 2004 CarswellOnt 4247, 24
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NB Inc, 2014 CarswellNB 363, 2014 NBCA46 at para 15.
83.
84.
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2. The plaintiff has not come to court with clean hands; or
3. There are others considerations that motivate a court of
equity to deny the order.
III. A critique
1. Introduction
Semelhago involves, in essence, a return to the earliest starting point
in the relationship between damages and specific performance. The
time-honoured principle is that the equitable remedy of performance is
available only if damages at law will not suffice to do justice. Whereas at
one time agreements for land were fast-tracked over this hurdle, the postSemelhago position is that this prerequisite (damages are inappropriate)
must be shown on the facts whenever performance is sought.
The damages-first rule is rooted in the history of the common law
and equity. Equity emerged to respond to instances in which justice was
not fully effectuated by the application of common law principles. Equity
serves as a remedial supplement to the perceived shortcomings of the law.
Again, in this context, there is no need to turn to equity when common law
damages will suffice."
Factors related to the administration of justice created a need for a
rational ordering of remedies. Before the administrative fusion of courts
of law and equity, these two judicial systems operated independently from
each other. Different judges applied different principles, and followed
different procedures. Lawyers tended to specialize in one form of practice
or the other. In that institutional context there was great potential for
conflict and disjuncture. Coordination of the two systems was essential.
The most important mediating principle holds that whenever there is a
conflict between law and equity, it is equity that prevails.8 6 However, there
is more to the harmonization than that one principle. Equity purports to
follow the law and often chooses to defer to it. For example, where a bona
fide purchaser of the legal estate acquires title without knowledge of a prior
equitable interest, the holder of the legal interest assumes priority. That
result obtains because equity chooses to protect the legal interest in these
circumstances. Likewise, the rule that damages at law is the presumptive
remedy represents a way to coordinate the two systems by providing a
starting point.
85. "[W]here the Common Law Courts always afforded adequate and complete relief without the
aid of the Court of Chancery . . and could take due care of the rights of all persons interested in the
property in litigation, there Equity had no jurisdiction": JW Smith, A Manual ofEquity Jurisprudence,
14th ed by J Trustram (London: Stevens & Sons, 1889) at 17.
86. As codified in JudicatureAct, RSA 2000, c J-2, s 15.
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Even afterthe administrative fusion of law and equity in the second half
of the 19th century, these two juristic sources have remained substantively
distinct, and equity's curative role continues. The presumptive remedy
of damages remains good law. However, the administrative fusion has
meant that the function of that presumption has lost a good deal of its
significance. A court hearing a civil dispute can dispense both law and
equity, so that the chance of conflicting orders is eliminated. Even so,
maintaining the current ordering can be justified out of a concern that a
change at such a basic level might produce unforeseen consequences. Law
is like a gossamer cloth, and removing a single strand can produce results
that raise problems of their own.
Even with that caution in mind, in this section I argue that the law
should be reformed. In doing so, I undertake an ahistorical assessment
of the current law. The question I address is whether turning first to
the common law, and only then to equity, produces the most just and
administratively rational outcome. In other words, I will wipe that slate
clean and ask what presumptive rule for remedies is most likely to produce
the fairest outcome most of the time.
The debate over the relative advantages of damages and specific
performance is not new. The topic has been extensively studied, and
powerful arguments, both moral and utilitarian in nature, have been
marshalled on both sides of the issue." The case for specific performance is
sometimes premised on the basic argument that parties should be expected
to fulfill contractual promises. Moreover, as a matter of efficiency, it is
important that parties be able to rely on contractual promises. Imagine
a world in which one party could unilaterally withdraw from a contract
at any time prior to performance, and how the normal flow of commerce
would be altered under such a regime.
These are compelling arguments, but they are contestable. It has been
argued that when damages are a true equivalent to performance, rational
parties should be indifferent as to remedy: they amount to the same thing.
If so, the choice of remedy should be dictated by other considerations. At
a conceptual plane, this "indifference" argument is attractive. However, at
the operational level, its potential flaws become apparent. Before deciding
whether to base the law of remedies on a presumption of indifference
we would ideally want to test the empirical validity of the underlying
assumptions. To be more specific, one would want to know whether

87. See further the useful synopsis of the key arguments in B Depoorter & S Tontrup, "How Law
Frames Moral Intuitions: The Expressive Effect of Specific Performance" (2012) 54 Ariz L Rev 673,
and the references cited there.
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parties are actually indifferent, and whether damages are likely to equal
performance in fact. I doubt both assumptions. I also believe that policy
considerations, defined broadly, support a preference for performance.
2. Most plaintiffs areprobably not in fact indifferent as to remedy
In an important article in the damages-performance debate, Anthony
Kronman suggested that if parties were to explicitly consider and bargain
for the kind of remedy available on breach, most would agree to the remedy
of performance for unique goods, but damages for fungibles." If Kronman
is right, current Canadian law seems to provide the appropriate default
rules. However, if we ask only what the innocent party would prefer, the
result is likely different. When a party seeks specific performance, and
claims damages only as an alternative, it is obvious that a preference is
being asserted. Money is regarded as the consolation prize. All else being
equal, one would expect that this party's preferences should, as a matter of
simple justice, trump those of the party in breach.
There is empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that a
preference for in-kind compensation is the norm for plaintiffs.8 9 In a recent
Israeli study, subjects were asked to choose between monetary and inkind compensation in a series of six hypothetical breach-events. Out of
about 400 lay respondents (non-business people), 69 per cent opted for
in-kind compensation, and 26 per cent chose money. Only 5 per cent were
indifferent as to how to be compensated for the loss. Of those who chose
the in-kind order, 46 per cent maintained that preference even if there was
some marginal increase in the monetary award. Those who responded
that they might accept additional money to forgo the right to the object
in question were asked to identify the quantum of that added premium.
The researcher concluded that these surplus demands were unrealistically
high. 9 0
Similar testing was done with a cohort of 126 businesspeople in an
effort to see if different attitudes might be held. Here the preference for
in-kind compensation was even more pronounced: 79 per cent preferred
the item in issue, 19 per cent chose the money, and only 2 per cent were
indifferent. Of those who preferred the item, 40 per cent were not interested
in an increased money award. Those who were amenable to that resolution,
as with the lay subjects, wanted unrealistically high premiums. 9 1

88. AT Kronman, "Specific Performance" (1978) 45 U Chicago L Rev 351.
89. D Lewinsohn-Zamir, "Can't Buy Me Love: Monetary Versus In-Kind Remedies" (2013) 1 U Ill
L Rev 151.
90. Ibid at 162.
91. Ibid at 170-171.
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In the end, the author of the study found "a strong preference for inkind remedies over monetary ones, even when the right holder is a firm
and even when the remedy is related to fungible, easily replaceable assets,
whose market value is ascertainable."9 2 From a policy perspective, this led
to the view that courts should be more willing to order specific performance
for breach of contract.93 Plaintiffs are not indifferent.
3. A damages award may notprovide appropriatecompensation
It is not obvious why the psychological preference for in-kind relief
described above is so strong. It may arise because injured parties are
responding to a host of irrational motives, such as anger, frustration, a
taste for revenge or retaliation, greed, etc. If such feelings explain the
preference, the law should be loath to cater to it. However, where the
disappointed purchaser prefers in-kind relief because of a concern that
money is an imperfect remedy, that scepticism may be well-placed.
It is not new to suggest that damages offer imperfect compensation.9 4
There are a number of key variables that must be determined before one
can arrive at a final dollar figure. One needs to determine the fair market
value of the property at issue. Where future development of the land is
planned, a number of computational variables can come into play. In a
given case it may also be necessary to determine if the innocent party has
acted reasonably in mitigating damages. Where these calculations are too
conjectural, Canadian courts can, and do, turn to specific performance. In
other instances, the prospect of error and unfairness, whether it takes the
form of over- or under-compensation, remains. 95
However, the problems go deeper than that. Even when these factual
inquiries are accurately answered, the law stops short of complete
compensation. For example, it was noted above that on one view damages
may be treated as adequate (or not inadequate) even if the party in default
is insolvent. 96 If these authorities are correct, to say specific performance
requires proof that damages are inadequate is based, in part, on a fiction.
A party with empty pockets cannot pay damages. Yet that is to be treated
as an invisible fact.
Consider also a case in which the property at issue is insufficiently
unique. Under the current law, an order for specific performance is

92. Ibid at 155.
93. Ibid at 182.
94. See e.g. Swan & Adamski, supra note 8, at 110. See also Da Silva, supra note 6, and the
references cited there.
95. Da Silva, supra note 6.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 32 and 33.
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unlikely, and damages will likely be set by reference to the land's value
at the time of breach. As we will see again below, the purchaser is at
this point called upon to mitigate the loss, which means that one is now
expected to seek out a substitute property.9 7 Let us think about these
events as part of an ongoing commercial venture. Once the sale contract
is signed, the investor would now be able to pass that file to the lawyers
to arrange the closing. The investor's focus can then turn to the next deal.
If the first contract falls through because of a breach, that investor cannot
simply instruct counsel to sue for performance. Instead, time must now be
devoted not to the next purchase but rather to the previous one. The various
transaction costs associated with finding a suitable replacement fall on the
shoulders of the innocent purchaser. Some of the tangible costs-legal
fees, searches, etc.-are amenable to recovery from the vendor in breach.
However, compensation for lost opportunities is not recoverable in this
context. Time spent on such tasks as searching for a substitute, obtaining
financing for that purchase, and so forth, is not compensable. Here, time
is not money. At the end of the day, the court will quantify some losses
and not others. Moreover, for the trouble of proceeding to court for that
recovery, the successful plaintiff may receive an order of compensation for
most-but usually not all-of the costs of that litigation.
4. A claim for damages taxes institutionalresources
In the exercise of its discretion, a court may decline to grant specific
performance on the groundthat the orderwould require ongoing supervision
by the courts. The underlying assumption is that judicial supervision can
impose too large a burden on scarce and costly institutional resources. It is
the conventional wisdom that courts are chronically overworked.
It is difficult to know with confidence how the pre- or post-Semelhago
rules affect the draw on judicial resources. It is possible that the law now
deters claims for specific performance in relation to properties that a
purchaser feels might not be viewed as unique by a court. We also do
not know whether, under the prior law, vendors chose to complete land
deals knowing that a court would likely compel the conveyance, rendering
breach by a vendor futile and expensive. Amid this empirical uncertainty,
one claim seems most plausible: when litigation ensues following breach,
the current law places greater demands on the judicial system than was the
case in the pre-Semelhago era.
Let us take stock of the number of damages-based issues that must be
addressed under a Semelhago analysis. First, one must determine whether

97.

See Part III, 3, infra.
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damages are inappropriate. As we know, that often (but not invariably)
raises the question of whether the property is unique such that a substitute
is not readily available. Second, a question may arise as to the proper time
as to when damages are to be assessed. As noted, the normal time is when
the breach occurred, but that rule is far from hard and fast.98 Third, the
market value of the property must be ascertained. Fourth, an issue may
anse as to whether the plaintiff acted in a reasonable way to mitigate the
losses. On all four of the key points, expert and other evidence may be
tendered.
Moreover, the resulting order is far from the end of the matter. For one
thing, the more issues for adjudication, the more opportunities for appeal
can emerge. However, even if the original holding is not challenged, the
order is merely a staging post on the path to financial recovery. After
judgment, the plaintiff must collect. That may entail judgment debtor
examinations initiated to determine what assets the judgment debtor has
to satisfy the order. Writs of enforcement may need to be issued against
property held by the debtor, and ajudicial sale might have to be conducted.
These can be costly and difficult processes. And, in the end, it may turn
out that the defendant does not have sufficient exigible assets to satisfy the
judgment.
There are fewer contestable issues when performance is the norm.
Computation questions are no longer germane.9 Moreover, even though, as
mentioned, equity is reluctant to order performance if ongoing supervision
is sought, one would think that would rarely be at issue in this context. A
land deal requires the exchange of documents and money on a chosen day.
If necessary, courts may prescribe the manner of compliance."'o Granted,
a failure to abide by those terms can give rise to follow-on proceedings
for contempt. However, those proceedings may also be necessary if a
monetary award is flouted.
5. The rules governing mitigationare suboptimal
The law's preference for damages over performance is sometimes
supported by the idea that this will minimize losses arising from breach.10 1
Under general contract law principles, following a breach the innocent
party is required to take reasonable steps to mitigate its losses. Put another
98.

See supra text accompanying note 19.
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way, avoidable losses are not regarded by the law as a direct consequence
of the breach, and therefore are not recoverable against the defaulting
party. The failure to mitigate disrupts the chain of legal causation between
breach and loss.
When a real estate purchase is involved and damages are sought, the
duty to mitigate supposes the following resolution. If a vendor fails to close
a sale of a property worth $1 million, the law expects the disappointed
purchaser to then seek out a substitute property. The market may have
risen between the time of the agreement and the date of breach (which
is usually the date when the closing should have occurred).10 2 Assume
the disappointed purchaser acts reasonably in pursuit of mitigation and
acquires the substitute for $1.2 million. The party in breach is expected
to make up the difference; damages would be $200,000. However, if
the innocent party acted irresponsibly in mitigation, damages should be
reduced. If the defendant can show that a prudent purchaser could have
acquired a new property for $1.1 million, damages will be set accordingly.
If the law stated that damages, and only damages, are available as a
remedy, then a disappointed purchaser knows that efforts to mitigate are
required as soon as a breach occurs. Disputes about mitigation can arise, but
only as to whether the action taken was sufficient under the circumstances.
However, once the ability to obtain specific performance is introduced into
the picture, it brings with it complications. When the purchaser prefers
in-kind recovery, that preference can be seen as antithetical to finding an
alternative property to mitigate the loss occasioned by the original breach.
Indeed, buying a substitute property may work to defeat the claim for
performance of the original contract.1 0 3 Hence, in a world in which either
remedy is possible, with damages as the first option, the innocent party
is placed at a crossroads. In a rising market, a purchaser who seeks, but
is denied, performance, may be found to have failed to take appropriate
action to mitigate. However, as just noted, acting in mitigation may
ultimately undermine a claim for performance.
The prior law was helpful in guiding the innocent party as to how to
respond to this fork in the remedial road. It declared to both the purchaser
and the vendor that the remedy for breach will normally be recovery in
specie; you need not seek to mitigate in another way. Semelhago also
directs the parties following breach, but in a different and less clear-cut
fashion. It declares a preference for mitigation through substitution. If the

102. CfJohn E Dodge HoldingsLtd v 805062 Ontario Ltd, supra note 26.
103. See e.g. Serebrennikov v Sawyer's Landing Investments I Ltd, 2010 BCSC 1276, 2010

CarswellBC 2415.
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property is not unique, then an adequate substitute should be available.
And because the subject property is not unique, pegging the measure of
damages should not be difficult. One can compare the prices of properties
similar to the contracted-for parcel to determine if there is a difference.
Even so, after Semelhago, a purchaser seeking performance takes a
greater risk, if the wrong road is taken. If specific performance is sought
but denied, the innocent party, by not acquiring a substitute, may be found
to have failed to mitigate.104 Yet, to regard every purchaser who does not
obtain performance as having also breached the duty to mitigate would
be harsh. Fortunately, that is not the law. Rather, if a failure to mitigate is
alleged, the defendant bears the burden of proving that a substitute could
have been found.o Moreover-and this is critical-a failure to mitigate is
justifiable where the plaintiff had a "fair, real, and substantial justification"
or "a substantial and legitimate interest" in asking for performance.10 6 If
so, the innocent party will not be held to have failed to mitigate.
Sensible as this middle ground is, there are costs associated with it.
It can result in both no in-kind recovery when the property is, at the end
of the day, found not to be unique. At the same time, there might also
be a finding that the duty to mitigate has not been breached because the
purchaser had a valid reason to seek performance. If so, the defendant
must then pay the full measure of damages. The interests of neither party
are well-served by that kind of outcome.
A strong presumption in favour of performance can achieve better
results on both counts. From the point ofview ofthe purchaser, performance
is perfect mitigation. That party has lost nothing because the object of the
bargain is obtained. As to the vendor, the law signals that a court would
very likely order the transfer of the property to the purchaser as agreed. At

104. Dove Homes (1999) Ltd v Fountain CreekEstates Ltd, 2012 ABQB 1, 2012 CarswellAlta 112.
105. Southcott Estates Inc v Toronto Catholic DistrictSchool Bd, supra note 8 at para 45.

106. Ibid at para 36, citing N Siebrasse, "Damages in lieu of Specific Performance: Semelhago
v Paramadevan" (1997) 76 Can Bar Rev 551. See also Shapiro v 1086891 Ontario Inc, 2006

CarswellOnt 217, 39 RPR (4th) 246 (SCJ). It has been offered that the upshot of Southcott is that
it is now increasingly difficult for property developers and investors to obtain specific performance:
J Berryman, "Mitigation, Specific Performance, and the Property Developer: Southcott Estates Inc
v Toronto Catholic District School Board' (2013) 51 Alta L Rev 165 at 171. Richard Olson goes

even further, maintaining that the Southcott case "may have rendered the equitable remedy of specific
performance for real estate contracts, and perhaps other remedies, rare and exotic": RJ Olson, "Who
Mourns for Specific Performance?" (2013) 71 The Advocate 851. But see Youyi Group Holdings
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may be overstating the effect of Semelhago and Southcott. In my respectful view, the Supreme Court
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the Supreme Court has not signalled that specific performance is 'on the way out' or that contracting
parties should no longer expect to be held to their bargains." I agree with Newbury JA.
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that point the vendor will receive the purchase moneys. If there is a rising
market, the vendor would be well advised to obtain that money at the
earliest opportunity, i.e., on the closing. If the property is not unique-in
fact, especially if the property is not unique-the vendor should be able
buy a substitute property. By definition, at one point the vendor agreed to
convey the land in exchange for cash. Money was the goal. If the property
is not unique, the vendor is as able as the innocent purchaser to obtain a
substitute.
In reading contract law case law, one is struck by how rarely there is
an inquiry into the reasons for the vendor's refusal to close. The reneging
vendor is not required to explain or justify the breach. A breach is not per
se considered wrongful in the eyes of law or equity. I can think of two main
reasons that might move a vendor to refuse to transfer the land. Sometimes
the validity of the underlying contract is called into question. The deal
does not close, it is claimed, because there is no valid contract requiring
compliance. Or, the vendor may resist specific performance because it is
now felt that transferring the property would produce a hardship, financial
or otherwise. I will deal with each in turn.
a. There is no contract When the existence of a binding contract is cast
in doubt and the purchaser sues, the land can wind up in limbo for a long
period. Prior to a judicial resolution, a purchaser intent on obtaining the
property is well advised to place an appropriate caution on title, such as
a certificate of pending litigation. From a functional perspective, this will
mean that, so long as the notice is on title, neither the would-be purchaser
nor the reluctant vendor holds a sellable asset. No one would buy such
a pig in a poke. Yet, at the same time, the price of the subject property
may fluctuate during this period. Given that there may or may not be a
valid contract, it is not clear on whose shoulders the risk entailed by price
changes should be placed.
Under the current law, the risk allocation in a rising market would
be spread as follows. If the property is indisputably unique, the vendor
bears the risk if a contract is found. Here, the purchaser would obtain
the property, which now enjoys a higher market value, and the vendor
will obtain the original (lower) purchase price. If, on the other hand, the
property is indisputably generic and a contract is found, the purchaser
would normally bear the risk. The vendor would keep the land and would
likely be required to pay no more than the (presumably) lower value of the
property pegged at the time of breach. Finally, if we consider the middle
ground, i.e., a scenario in which there is an arguable case for performance,
the allocation of risk is less easy to ascertain.
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If the law is modified to provide for a virtually ironclad presumption
in favour of performance, in all three of these scenarios the defaulting
vendor would bear the risk of financial loss were a contract found to exist.
That might appear to be unfair. In effect, the law would be declaring
that a purchaser is (almost) never required to mitigate. However, it is
remembered that in these disputes, the risk associated with a finding of
no contract is always on the purchaser in a rising market. If at the end
of the day it is resolved that no binding obligations have been assumed,
the vendor retains the property with its increased value and the purchaser
is entitled to nothing. Hence, under this suggested approach both parties
have reason to be careful when challenging the existence of a contract. At
the very least, this proposed approach can serve to dissuade the parties
from engaging in wasteful strategic behaviour in a lawsuit. It can induce
both parties to cut their losses (i.e., mitigate) unless they believe that they
have a reasonable chance of winning.
b. The vendor 's self-interest is best served by breach
As mentioned above, arguments supporting specific performance can have
moral or instrumental bases. In reply, it has been argued that sometimes
a breach of contract is in fact a rational, efficient, and morally defensible
step for a contracting party to take. Hence, it is maintained that the law
should countenance what is termed "efficient breach,"10' a concept that has
received some judicial endorsement in Canada.10 s
A breach is described as efficient whenever it will make the party in
breach better off (in financial terms), but still leave the innocent party
no worse off than if the original contract had been performed. A vendor
should be permitted, perhaps even encouraged, to refuse to close when it
is financially the best choice, provided always that the innocent party is
not thereby harmed. In law and economic terms, this kind of economic
efficiency is described as a Pareto superior, or as a Pareto improvement.109
The innocent party is regarded as being no worse off if damages equal
to the loss are paid. We have already seen that this level of recovery is
often not reached.110 However, for the purposes of the present analysis
that practical problem will be ignored. Assuming that there will be full
compensation, if there is an efficient breach, the contract-breaker seeks to

107. See generally, M Bigoni et al, "Unbundling Efficient Breach," online: <ssrncom/
abstract=2477973>; MAEisenberg, "Actual and Virtual Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach,
and the Indifference principle in Contract Law" (2005) 93 Cal L Rev 975.
108. Bank ofAmerica Canadav Mutual Trust Co, [2002] 2 SCR 601 at para 31.

109. See further K Mathis, Efficiency Instead ofJustice? (New York: Springer, 2009) at 32ff.
110. See part III, 3, supra.
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pay damages so as to then be permitted to deal with the property in some
other way. An order of specific performance that stifles efficient breach is,
by definition, inefficient.
Here is a standard example. A agrees to sell a widget to B for $9,000,
which happens to be $1,000 below fair market value. Prior to the transfer,
A receives an offer from C for the inflated price of $12,000. It would
make sense for A to sell to C. To make B whole, B would be entitled to
a damages award of $1,000. Now B can buy the same kind of widget at
market value (with $10,000 in hand), and so is no worse off A will now
have $11,000 (not $9,000), even after paying damages to B. A is better off,
B is not harmed. C, who values the widget the most of the three parties,
now owns it.
Not every breach is efficient in this way. Assume the same facts, except
that the agreed price was $9,000, which at the time of contracting was its
fair market value. Before the closing, the widget market heats up such that
a widget now fetches $12,000. One might assume that a rational wealthmaximizing vendor will wish to breach the initial agreement with B and
seek out a new buyer, such as C. That, however, is not an efficient breach
as that term is defined here. Under Canadian law, to make the plaintiff
whole, A must provide damages that will be equal to the replacement cost
as at the time of breach. That cost is now $12,000. In this situation, A
will not come out ahead. A will owe B damages in the amount of $3,000,
leaving A with $9,000, the initial price. A's breach is efficiency neutral.
When land is involved, the second scenario applies with equal force.
Moreover, even in the first scenario, what I have called the standard
example, when land is involved it may be rash to assume that there is an
efficient breach. Imagine if, in this standard example, B could and did
obtain specific performance. The order would prevent a sale by A to C.
By the same token, B can now realize a profit of $3,000 by a sale to C.
To put it another way, if the vendor (A) could sell the property, so could
the purchaser (B). To pay a penny less in damages would mean that the
purchaser is worse off by reason only of the breach, for the breach has
denied B the chance of a quick profit. You will notice that when B acquired
a generic property for the purpose of re-sale, specific performance is a
perfectly sensible remedy.
The land situation may be different from that ofthe widget sale because
it may be difficult for C to locate the new owner of the widget. Hence, a
sale from B to C may not occur. For land, locating the new owner is a far
simpler matter: one searches the title. Hence, if specific performance were
ordered, A would receive the bargained-for price, B would make a quick
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profit, and the land would wind up in the hands of the party valuing it
most, C. This is efficient compliance.
Given this analysis, for the efficient breach reasoning to ever justify
damages over performance it is necessary to show one of two things. One
is that that the innocent party (B) could not have reaped the increased
surplus that the defendant (A) is seeking. Alternatively, it must be shown
that the cost of compliance may be so great that the vendor (A) is better off
by paying damages to B to cut its losses.
As to the first of these situations, consider a case where V has agreed
to sell Lot #1. Before closing, three neighbouring lots come on the market.
V sees an opportunity to acquire these neighbouring properties and build
a development that is worth more than separate developments on each lot.
Assume further that P does not have the resources to buy these adjacent
properties. If the value of the parcel to V exceeds the measure of damages,
V would be wise to retain the land, breach the contract, and pay damages.
The second kind of scenario concerns a situation in which breach
occurs soley in order to cut losses, and not to reap a surplus. Imagine a
situation in which V agrees to sell a property for $1 million and covenants
to provide vacant possession. At the time of sale, there are tenants in the
building upon whom V intends to serve notices to vacate. However, it is
subsequently realized that certain tenants have more enduring leasehold
rights than V understood to be the case, and that the cost of providing
vacant possession to the purchaser as promised is estimated to be $1.2
million. In this case, it would be foolish and wasteful for the vendor to
close. The prudent action is to staunch the bleeding, refuse to close and
pay damages to the purchaser. The vendor would then retain the property
(a $1 million asset), minus the damages that must be paid to the purchaser.
By contrast, closing the deal would have left the vendor without the asset.
Moreover, an amount equal to the entire sale price plus an additional
$200,000 would have been needed to perform the contract. The vendor
would have suffered a net loss of $200,000. Hence, unless the damages to
the purchaser would exceed $1.2 million, a breach is the smartest move
for the vendor to make.
Whether efficient breach is a viable concept remains a topic of debate
among economists.' For the sake of argument, let us accept that both
kinds of efficient breach may occur and the law should tolerate that
action. Even so, to treat efficient breach as supportive of a damages-first
presumption would, it would seem, overvalue its importance. Not every
breach is efficient; one would think that it is the exception and not the
111. See further JL Harrison, "ANihilistic View of the Efficient Breach" [2013:1] Mich St L Rev 167.
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rule. Equity, always mindful that an order may impose undue hardship on
a defendant, can refuse performance on that ground. Hence, even if the
law presumed in-kind relief, a defendant would be able to avoid that result
where efficient breach-or any other form of hardship-is proven on the
balance of probabilities.
6. It is inappropriateto require uniqueness when the vendor seeks
performance
As discussed above, the rules governing the availability of specific
performance apply to vendors as well as purchasers.1 12 Equity here is
premised on a notion of mutuality: that which is available to one party
must likewise be open to the other. So, there is parity of treatment, at least
superficially. Even so, one can question why uniqueness matters when
it is something else-money-being claimed by the innocent vendor. It
was seen above that in this context, uniqueness can best be understood as
referring to special features of the deal as a whole, and not the land per
se. 113 A property built for the sole purpose of sale to a certain purchaser
is an example. When that is the case, the unique element is that the target
market is only one buyer.
But is it true that such a parcel, developed to meet a highly specific
niche need, has no other market? Imagine a lot that was developed to
serve as an amusement park for a given purchaser, who resiled from the
agreement just prior to closing. Assume also that the purchaser is in fact
insolvent, so that suing for performance is a fool's errand. In such a case,
a prudent vendor would be well advised to raze the improvements and sell
a vacant parcel, or deduct the cost of demolition from the new sale price,
and then sue (for what it is worth) for any residual losses. In other words,
mitigation is possible and is the best option here, even when a so-called
unique transaction is involved.
In my view, the ability of vendors to seek specific performance should
not depend on uniqueness, but rather on practicality. Consider a simple
case where the purchaser, while in a position to pay, reneges on the deal
at closing. If specific performance is ordered and satisfied, the vendor is
made whole. If specific performance is not available, one expects that the
property will be offered for sale a second time. The difference between
these two means of liquidation is that the second procedure has two
steps: a sale followed by a claim for any losses resulting from that sale.
Streamlining the process of recovery by eliminating one step seems a valid
reason to prefer performance. Uniqueness has no bearing on that analysis.
112. See Part III, s 5, supra.
113. Matthew BradySelf`Storage Corp v InStorage Limited Partnership,supra note 69.
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Moreover, the uniqueness of a parcel can affect the price in either
direction. A property might be so special that it attracts only a select cohort
of interested parties, as in the example above. However, a home with a
rare and perfect view of the ocean might attract a great deal of interest.
Again, from the vendor's point of view, that is merely a matter of price.
If anything, it is the lack of uniqueness that should support, not defeat, a
claim for specific performance by a vendor. It seems counterintuitive for a
purchaser to argue that because the property is generic and not unique, the
vendor should be forced to sell it again on the open market, in competition
with any number of other readily available alternatives.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that justice is better served by a presumption in
favour of specific performance as the remedy for breach of contract for the
sale of land. This is not a radical claim by any means, and forms the law
in many common law jurisdictions. I join the chorus of those who argue
that Canadian law should, in essence, be returned to the pre-Semelhago
position.
In sum, I believe the following principles should govern land-sale
remedies:
1. At trial, a plaintiff, whether purchaser or vendor, seeking specific
performance must prove only that there has been a breach of a
valid contract, and that the plaintiff is ready, willing and able to
complete the transaction.
2. A defendant may resist an order for specific performance where
it can be proven that:
(a) the order would give rise to undue hardship on that party or
to a third party; or
(b) the plaintiff has not come to court with clean hands; or
(c) there are others considerations that motivate a court of
equity to deny the order.
It is difficult to be certain about which order of remedies will produce
the best outcomes. In reviewing the relevant literature and case law, it is
striking how little is actually known about the ways in which the rules
being considered affect conduct. Instead, we make educated guesses about
the impact of the law. One sees similar educated guesswork in Sopinka J.'s
assertion in Semelhago that land, circa 1996, is no longer to be regarded
as inherently unique. In effect, he took judicial notice of that very pivotal
"truth."

The legal analysis in the judgment is just as thin. It does not engage
any of the policy concerns discussed above. That omission is not all that
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surprising. The availability of specific performance was not put in issue
and the relevant arguments and authorities were not aired and reviewed.
In consequence, Sopinka J.'s statements were obiter, and have been
understood as such.
In recent years, there has been some confusion about the status of
obiter that emanates from the Supreme Court of Canada. Regarding
obiter dictum as binding on lower courts is a deviation from conventional
principles of stare decisis. In theory, only those parts of the judgment
that can be said to form the ratio decidendi of the case are binding. Yet,
some Canadian courts have hewed extremely closely to Supreme Court
pronouncements, relying on statements from that court (obiterof course),
that are read as dictating that lower courts should regard themselves as
bound by such dicta."'
In 2005, the Supreme Court addressed this issue. It was acknowledged
that not all obiter should be accorded equal weight by lower courts. Instead,
"[t]he weight decreases as one moves from the dispositive ratio decidendi
to a wider circle of analysis which is obviously intended for guidance and
which should be accepted as authoritative."' Other comments, those
further from the centre of the ruling, may be persuasive but not binding.
The Court advised the goal of deploying obiter for guidance is to provide
certainty while at the same time leaving room for growth and creativity.
The Court also cautioned against parsing obiter comments as one would
a statute.116
It seems likely that the statements in Semelhago were "intended for
guidance and... should be accepted as authoritative," just as they have
been treated by all subsequent reported decisions. When a related issue
reached the Supreme Court in 2012, it treated Semelhago as an established
point of departure for analysis."' There is, however, a good reason why
obiter dictum should not be regarded as binding, especially when the
critical issues were not before the court. The parties had no interest in
presenting argument on the point. Nothing turned on it. There was no
adversarial battle over the ordering of remedies." One could argue that in
these circumstances obiter dictum should have reduced weight even if it is
designed to serve as authoritative guidance.1 1 9
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The lack of argument on point is precisely why La Forest J. wrote a
short and often overlooked concurring opinion in Semelhago. La Forest
J. agreed with the outcome in the case, but refrained from endorsing the
broader themes addressed by the majority. It was his view that, given the
manner in which this case was argued, this dispute did not afford a suitable
opportunity to consider reforming the existing law. 120
La Forest J.'s reticence was well-placed, and a thorough assessment
of the law governing specific performance for land deals should occur, be
it at the legislative or judicial level. As argued above, I endorse a return to
the law prior to Semelhago.

120. Semelhago, supra note 2 at para 1.

